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Premature Deindustrialization through The Lens of Occupations:




A recent literature documents that manufacturing employment growth in developing countries has
been sluggish over the past decades, and that deindustrialization has often set in at historically low
levels of income. However, there is little evidence on which kind of jobs are disappearing prematurely,
and some debate on whether the phenomenon is structural or transitory. In this article, I use a new
data set on manufacturing employment by occupation to document four stylized facts about `premature
deindustrialization': rst, it is mostly unskilled jobs that have disappeared, and also the wage premium
of workers with little formal education in manufacturing relative to other industries has declined. Second,
the disappearing jobs have been among the most formalboth relative to other industries, and to the
manufacturing average. Third, premature deindustrialization has been driven by occupations which are
intensive in tasks that are vulnerable to an increasing adoption of ICT. Fourth, the phenomenon pertains
most clearly to middle income countries, as low income countries have been spared from premature job
losses. Overall, the employment patterns are consistent with a pervasive shift of the `automation frontier'
separating tasks that are automated from those which are not, and suggest a structural decrease in the
ability of manufacturing to employ unskilled labor productively.
JEL: J2, N6, O1, O3
Keywords: premature deindustrialization, manufacturing, technological change, globalization
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1 Introduction
Manufacturing has long been considered a quintessential stepping stone on the development ladder due to
its ability to employ unskilled workers productively (Lewis, 1954). Reallocating workers from agriculture
to manufacturing promises large gains in economy-wide productivity, and structural transformation-fuelled
growth can take place even if `fundamentals' such as educational attainments lag behind (Rodrik, 2013).
However, a recent literature initiated by Rodrik (2016) documents that developing countries have been
running out of manufacturing employment opportunities earlier and at much lower levels of income in re-
cent decades, compared to the experience of early industrializers. This raises the question to what degree
manufacturing is still able to play its traditional role in economic development.
Existing studies of premature industrialization focus on aggregate manufacturing employment, which
leaves open the question what kind of jobs have disappeared `prematurely'. In particular, is it jobs that
unskilled workers from the countryside may previously have been able to take up? Moroever, many of the
benets ascribed to manufacturing pertain in particular to formal manufacturing, whereas La Porta and
Shleifer (2008) paint a rather bleak picture of wages and productivity in informal manufacturing rms.
Hence, the consequences of premature deindustrialization for development prospects hinge on whether it is
mostly formal or informal manufacturing jobs that have disappeared.
Second, there is some debate about the origins of `premature deindustrialization': Rodrik (2016) and
Felipe et al. (2018) assign a prominent role to labor-saving technological progress, whereas Haraguchi et al.
(2017) argue that developing countries' diculties are entirely due to globalization- and more specically,
due to the entry of China into the world market, with its strong comparative advantage in manufacturing.1
Also the recent increases in manufacturing employment in some lower income countries such as Vietnam or
Cambodia raise questions about the generality of the phenomenon of premature job losses.
From the perspective of the task literature initiated by Autor et al. (2003), a testable implication of the
technological change-based explanations is a reduction in labor demand for the production tasks that have
only recently become automatable (as opposed to manufacturing employment across the board). However,
such an assessment requires moving beyond aggregate manufacturing employment.
To address these questions, I analyze trends in manufacturing employment by occupation in 125 countries
for multiple years between 1960 and 2014, obtained from harmonized household surveys. While the sample
is imbalanced, country coverage goes signicantly beyond the 42 countries in Rodrik (2016) and the 62
countries in Felipe et al. (2018), and the sample includes a greater number of poorer developing countries in
particular. A subset of the surveys also includes data on education, wages, and the formality of employment.
1This makes Haraguchi et al. (2017) considerably more optimistic about the future prospects for manufacturing-led growth
in developing countries: `After its success in labor intensive industries, China is likely to upgrade its industrial structure
following the path of high-income countries. Once this happens, there may be greater opportunities for current low-income
countries to pursue manufacturing activities; manufacturing would then perhaps become more, not less, important for them.
Thus, the recommendation for developing countries is to not turn away from manufacturing and abandon the path of economic
development through industrialization, but to emulate the experience of rapid industrialization that occurred even in recent
years' (p. 307).
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Analyzing employment trends in manufacturing from the perspective of occupations is insightful because
occupations dier along three dimensions that are relevant to the open questions: they require dierent
levels of skill, dier in their typical level of formality of employment, and also dier in their intensity in tasks
that are vulnerable to digitization (dened as an increasing adoption of ICT).
Drawing on the survey data, I document four stylized facts about premature deindustrialization: rst,
it is mostly unskilled jobs that have disappeared, and also the wage premium of workers with little formal
education in manufacturing, relative to other industries, has declined. Second, disappearing jobs tend to be
formalboth relative to the overall labor market, and to the manufacturing average. Third, it is driven by
occupations which are intensive in tasks that are vulnerable to digitization. And nally, it has to date been
a middle income country-phenomenon, as low income countries have been spared from premature job losses.
In the next Section, I present my data and repeat the analyses by Rodrik (2016) separately by occupation:
essentially, I compare the results from regressing manufacturing employment shares by occupation on country
xed eects and ln GDP per capitaincluding an interaction with a time-dummy for the later part of
my sample period, in order to identify which occupations account for the `premature' losses in aggregate
manufacturing employment. Section 3 presents the four stylized facts about premature deindustrialization,
drawing on the trends in the occupational employment structure and additional survey evidence. Section 4
oers an interpretation of my ndings.
2 Premature Deindustrialization Through the Lens of Occupations
Existing studies of premature deindustrialization rely on data sources that do not distinguish between dif-
ferent groups of manufacturing workers.2 To address this gap, I combine census and survey data from the
`Integrated Public Use Microdata Series' (IPUMS), provided by the Minnesota Population Center (2018),
with survey data from the `International Income Distribution Data base' (I2D2). I2D2 is a collection of
harmonized and nationally representative household surveys introduced by Montenegro and Hirn (2009) and
maintained by the World Bank.3 Census and other survey data have the additional advantage that they
tend to have more complete coverage of informal employment than national accounts data (McMillan et al.,
2014).
The resulting data set contains the distribution of manufacturing employment across the nine major
2They use data from either the UN National Accounts Main Aggregates Data Base, the Groningen Growth or Development
Center (Timmer et al., 2015a), or the data base on manufacturing employment for 63 countries assembled by Felipe et al. (2018)
from various sources. The UN data and the data set by Felipe et al. (2018) go back to 1970, whereas the Timmer et al. (2015a)
data set includes only 42 countries, but goes back to the late 1940s/ early 1950s for many of them.Rodrik (2016) does present
evidence of a recent reduction in the demand for unskilled workers in the manufacturing industries of the countries represented
in the `World Input Output Data Base' by Timmer et al. (2015b) (see Section 3 for a more detailed discussion). However, the
countries in this sample are mostly high income countries, and the data start only in 1995. Hence, this result cannot easily be
compared to his nding of premature deindustrialization in developing countries when comparing the pre-1990 to the post-1990
period.
3I2D2 is currently not openly available to researchers outside the World Bank. I am grateful to Kathleen G. Beegle, Claudio
E. Montenegro, David Newhouse and Aditi Mishra for making these data available to me.
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occupation groups of the `International Standard Classication of Occupations' (ISCO) for 980 country-year
observations from 148 countries between 1960 and 2016. I add data on GDP in 2011 international dollar and
population from the Penn World Table (Feenstra et al., 2015) to obtain my main analysis sample: it contains
data on employment and income from 125 countries, accounting for 91 percent of the world population in
2014, for at least two years between 1960 and 2014 (with an average of 7.4 years per country, and an average
spread of 19 years between the rst and the last survey). Appendix A describes the sample construction and
coverage in more detail.
To examine how the manufacturing employment share of a country typically varies with income, Column
(1) of Table 1 regresses it on ln GDP per capita and its square, ln population and its square, decade dummies
and country xed eects (corresponding to the specication in Rodrik (2016)). The population terms control
for the size of the home market (although results are not sensitive to omitting them), and the country xed
eects control for dierences in time invariant dierences between countries, for instance related to geography.
The results conrm Rodrik's nding that aggregate manufacturing employment exhibits a signicant inverse
U-shape in income.
In Table 2, I follow Rodrik (2016) and test for a tendency of total manufacturing employment to decline
`prematurely' in recent decades by replacing the decade dummies with interactions between the ln GDP per
capita-terms and a dummy variable taking a value of one for surveys from the period after 1990.4 Column
(1) conrms his nding of a signicant shift of the hump-shaped relationship to the left between both
periods for total manufacturing, using a dierent data source. For a visual representation, Figure 1 plots the
corresponding tted employment share for a `typical' country with median population and average country
xed eects against income, both with and without taking into account the post 1990-interactions: while
the predicted peak employment share does not change much between both periods, the estimated GDP per
capita level at the peak of manufacturing employment declines by more than half, from $11,000 to $5,100.5
Next, I move beyond the previous literature by distinguishing between ve sub-groups of manufactur-
ing workers, which allow for a rened perspective on the phenomenon of premature deindustrialization:
`elementary occupations', `machine operators', `craftsmen' and `clerks' correspond directly to ISCO major
groups, whereas `professionals' subsume ISCO major groups 1-3.6These occupations will be characterized
4As Rodrik writes, using the 1990 year as a break-point is somewhat arbitrarybut it ensures a sucient number of observa-
tions on either side, and is also useful as a demarcation of the period in which globalization gathered speed. Morever, I follow
Rodrik in not including the post 1990-dummy independently in the specication, thereby not allowing for a trend in the share
of manufacturing employment between both periods that is unrelated to dierences in ln GDP per capita. However, all results
are qualitatively similar when relaxing this restriction.
5In Rodrik (2016), peak manufacturing employment declines from 21.5 to 18.9 percent between both periods, and the income
level at which it is reached falls from $11,000 to $4,300 (in 1990 dollars). With respect to the income level at peak manufacturing
employment, his estimates for both periods are close to mine (of $11,000 and $5,100 respectively, in 2011 dollars), whereas his
peak manufacturing employment shares are higher than mine (of 16.3 and 16.2 percent). This is likely because the 42 countries
in his sample include a larger share of relatively industrialized countries (compared to my sample of 125 countries), and because
his sample reaches back to the late 1940s/early 1950s (compared to at most 1960 in my sample).
6And hence, `managers', `professionals' and `technicians and associate professionals'. Occupations in these major groups
tend to be intensive in skilled and non-routine tasks, and distinguishing between them reveals no large dierences that would
be relevant to the arguments made in this paper. Appendix B presents the description of the ISCO major groups by the ILO,
which I will introduce in more detail in Section 3.
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in increasing detail throughout the rest of the paper.7 To start with, columns (2)-(6) of Table 1 show how
manufacturing employment in these ve occupation groups varies with income. Point estimates suggest that
employment shares for all of them, except professionals, follow an inverse U-shape.
However, Figure 2 (which again plots the tted employment shares for a `typical' country in the sample)
highlights that the occupational employment structure varies strongly with income: at low income levels,
manufacturing employment consists almost entirely of craftsmen. Craftsman employment in turn peaks
already at a GDP per capita around $3,300which is when employment in the other occupations, and
especially of machine operators, tends to grow rapidly. Employment in clerical and elementary occupations
peaks at intermediate income levels ($8,900 and $9,100 respectively), whereas machine operator employment
only declines after an income of $17,000 has been reached. Employment of manufacturing professionals even
increases over the entire observed income range.8
In Section 3, I argue that for the debate about the origins of premature deindustrialization as well as
for its labor market consequences, it matters which of these occupations account for the `premature' em-
ployment losses after 1990. To rst establish the facts, columns (2)-(6) of Table 2 show that the premature
deindustrialization in terms of aggregate manufacturing employment shown in column (1) is driven by ma-
chine operator-, elementary- and clerical occupations, as these occupations also experienced signicantly
decreasing employment shares after 1990 (conditional on income). By contrast, the interaction terms are
insignicant for craftsmen and professional occupations (individually as well as jointly).
Figure 3 plots the corresponding tted employment shares by income: it conrms that employment peaks
at much lower levels of income in the post-1990 period for machine operators ($8,400, vs. $28,100 up to 1990)
and clerks ($5,900 vs. $26,000). For elementary occupations, a peak only exists for the post-1990 period (at
$11,100), whereas tted employment increases almost linearly over the observed income range for the early
period. Moroever, the simulated peak employment shares decrease substantially especially for elementary
occupations (from 2.7 to 1.6 percent) and machine operators (from 4.9 to 3.9 percent). By contrast, tted
craftsman and professional employment look very similar for both periods, consistent with the small and
insignicant interaction terms in Table 2.
7These characterizations will stay at the level of major groups and total manufacturing, since the surveys contain occupation
and industry-coding only at the 1-digit level of ISCO and ISIC. However, the `Occupational Wages Around the World' (OWW)
data base, rst described by Freeman and Oostendorp (2000), contains examples from each of these ve aggregated occupation
groups at the 4-digit level of ISCO, and the 2-digit level if ISIC. For instance, it includes the machine operator occupations
`thread and yarn spinner' and `cloth weaver (machine)' from the textiles industry, as well as the craftsman occupation `loom
xer, tuner' and the elementary occupation `labourer'. The occupations from the printing & publishing industry include the
clerical occupation `oce clerk', and occupations from the chemical industry include the `chemical engineer'. See Kunst (2019)
for more examples at the level of more disaggregated occupations and industries, including detailed task descriptions.
8For an alternative perspective, Appendix Figure C.1 plots the corresponding occupational employment shares after nor-
malizing total manufacturing employment to 100 for every country-year, which facilitates answering the question which of the
occupations is most important within manufacturing. As the Figure highlights, the answer to this question strongly depends on
a country's income level: in the lowest income countries, more than 80 percent of manufacturing workers tend to be craftsmen,
and craftsmen remain important also at intermediate income ranges. At the upper end of observed income levels, professionals
are the most important group of manufacturing workers, and the employment share of the other occupations within manufac-
turing increases most strongly at low and intermediate income levels. See Kunst (2019) for an analysis of labor demand changes
within manufacturing since the 1950s.
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Appendix Table C.1 presents the results of two robustness checks: rst, I exclude about 6 percent of the
surveys which do not contain manufacturing observations for all ve occupations (resulting in an employment
share of zero for the respective occupation). This may indicate that some occupations did not play any role
in the respective country and yearbut could also hint at issues with the sampling, or the harmonization of
the occupation classication. However, results are robust to excluding such surveys.
Second, I keep only surveys from the 43 countries for which my sample includes at least one survey for both
the period up to and after 1990. Also for this sub-sample, I nd a signicant shift in the relationship between
manufacturing employment and income for total manufacturing as well as elementary, machine operator and
clerical occupations, but not for craftsmen and professionals. This suggests that even within the same
countries, the relationships between changes in income and manufacturing employment has changed.9
In summary, the evidence robustly suggests that manufacturing employment in elementary-, machine
operator- and clerical occupations has disappeared `prematurely' after 1990, whereas employment in craftsman-
and professional occupations did not. In the next Section, I discuss the labor market consequences and origin
of these employment trends by proposing four stylized facts about premature deindustrialization.
9To save space, I present the results from these robustness checks for joint employment in elementary, machine operator and
clerical occupations, and for joint employment in craftsmen and professional occupations. However, results are similar to those
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Figure 1: Simulated employment shares for total manufacturing: period up to versus post-1990
The Figure shows the predicted manufacturing employment shares in the periods up to and after 1990 from a regression
on ln GDP per capita and its square, interactions with a post-1990 dummy, ln population and its square, and country
xed eects. Period and country eects are all averaged and the population size is set to the sample median to obtain
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Figure 2: Simulated manufacturing employment in total employment (percentage points)
The Figure shows the predicted manufacturing employment shares from a regression on ln GDP per capita and its
square, ln population and its square, decade xed eects and country xed eects. Period and country eects are all
averaged and the population size is set to the sample median to obtain the relationship for a `typical' country in the
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Peaks: 16.3−>16.2%; $11,000−>$5,100
All occupations
Up to 1990 After 1990
Figure 3: Simulated manufacturing employment shares by occupation: period up to versus post-1990
All simulations are based on the models presented in Table 2. The subtitles of each Figure in the panel indicate the
highest simulated employment share in the period up to and after 1990, as well as the estimated GDP per capita
levels at which this peak employment is reached.
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Table 1: Manufacturing employment as a function of income
Dependent variable: manufacturing employment in total employment, ages 15-64 (percentage points)
Total Occupation split
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Elementary Operators Craftsmen Clerks Professionals
ln GDP/c 41.01∗∗ 4.97∗∗ 12.74∗∗ 16.58∗∗ 5.17∗∗ -1.28
(8.08) (1.72) (3.97) (5.58) (1.20) (1.27)
ln GDP/c squared -2.26∗∗ -0.27∗∗ -0.65∗∗ -1.02∗∗ -0.28∗∗ 0.13+
(0.43) (0.09) (0.23) (0.30) (0.07) (0.07)
ln population 5.49∗ 0.22 4.02+ 0.18 0.54 0.16
(2.43) (0.57) (2.14) (2.44) (0.34) (0.56)
ln population squared 0.19 0.01 -0.26 0.55∗ -0.05 -0.07
(0.31) (0.10) (0.16) (0.26) (0.05) (0.07)
1970s -2.07∗ 0.41+ -2.78∗ 0.08 0.10 -0.05
(0.99) (0.23) (1.33) (1.02) (0.15) (0.19)
1980s -3.89∗ 0.45 -3.65+ -1.18 -0.07 0.32
(1.57) (0.37) (1.96) (1.62) (0.22) (0.30)
1990s -5.58∗∗ 0.53 -4.36+ -2.48 -0.24 0.52
(1.70) (0.39) (2.26) (1.72) (0.28) (0.33)
2000s -7.50∗∗ 0.44 -5.01+ -2.83 -0.47 0.45
(2.03) (0.46) (2.53) (1.98) (0.33) (0.37)
2010s -9.68∗∗ 0.38 -5.80∗ -3.59+ -0.67+ 0.23
(2.23) (0.52) (2.73) (2.14) (0.36) (0.43)
R2 0.259 0.031 0.136 0.181 0.185 0.142
Country xed eects X X X X X X
F-test joint GDP/c 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean dep. var. 13.79 1.40 2.62 6.10 0.79 2.16
Countries 125 125 125 125 125 125
Observations 925 925 925 925 925 925
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country level. + p < 0.1,∗ p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01. Employment data
are taken from I2D2 and IPUMS (see Section 2), and data on GDP per capita in 2011 International Dollars are taken
from the Penn World Table 9.0. The `mean dependent variables' in columns (2)-(6) not exactly add up to the number
for total manufacturing in column (1), as the total include some manufacturing workers in major group 5 (`service
and sales workers') and 6 (`skilled agricultural, forestry and shery workers'). However, these major groups tend to
play a negligible role in manufacturing employment. `F-test joint GDP/c' in the bottom panel presents the p-value
of an F-test for joint signicance of ln GDP per capita and its square.
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Table 2: Manufacturing employment as a function of income: period up to versus post-1990
Dependent variable: manufacturing employment in total employment, ages 15-64 (percentage points)
Total Occupation split
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Elementary Operators Craftsmen Clerks Professionals
ln GDP/c 33.24∗∗ 2.06 10.68∗ 18.86∗∗ 3.27∗∗ -2.80∗
(8.05) (1.37) (4.78) (5.70) (1.01) (1.33)
ln GDP/c squared -1.79∗∗ -0.08 -0.52+ -1.18∗∗ -0.16∗∗ 0.21∗
(0.44) (0.08) (0.28) (0.31) (0.06) (0.08)
ln GDP/c x post-1990 2.99∗∗ 0.64∗∗ 1.22∗ 0.17 0.50∗∗ 0.16
(0.91) (0.24) (0.49) (0.72) (0.11) (0.14)
ln GDP/c squared x post-1990 -0.34∗∗ -0.07∗∗ -0.14∗ -0.03 -0.06∗∗ -0.02
(0.09) (0.03) (0.06) (0.08) (0.01) (0.02)
ln population -2.22 -0.14 0.09 -2.14 -0.25 0.24
(2.50) (0.48) (0.86) (2.34) (0.23) (0.40)
ln population squared 0.21 0.00 -0.19 0.52+ -0.05 -0.07
(0.35) (0.08) (0.15) (0.27) (0.05) (0.06)
Country xed eects X X X X X X
F-test joint GDP/c 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
F-test joint GDP/c x post-1990 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.70 0.00 0.36
Mean dep. var. 13.79 1.40 2.62 6.10 0.79 2.16
Countries 125 125 125 125 125 125
Observations 925 925 925 925 925 925
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country level. + p < 0.1,∗ p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01. The mean dependent
variables in column (1) slightly exceeds the sum of columns (2)-(6) because it also includes manufacturing workers
classied into major group 5 (`Service and sales workers') or major group 6 (`Skilled agricultural, forestry and shery
workers'). These occupations are omitted from the analyses by occupation group as they tend to represent a negligible
share of manufacturing employment. The rows `F-test joint GDP/c' in the bottom panel present the p-values of F-tests
for joint signicance of ln GDP/c and its square, with and without the post-1990 interaction.
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3 Four Stylized Facts about Premature Deindustrialization
Stylized Fact I: It's mostly about Unskilled Jobs
Table 3 presents average wage premia, educational attainments and average employment sharesboth for
non-manufacturing versus manufacturing, and by manufacturing occupation. Not all of the variables are
available for surveys from all countries, and column (1) indicates the number of countries across which
the sample average has been calculated. Columns (2) and (3) of the rst panel show that on average,
manufacturing workers tended to be relatively well paid: workers outside of manufacturing earned a 6.6 log
points lower wage than those within (for which the wage premium in the second row is zero by construction),
and this holds true across all income groups.10
My preferred proxy for the skill requirements of manufacturing occupations are wage premia, as they
take into account both formal education and skills obtained through training on the job.11 Columns (4)-
(8) present average wage premia by occupation group, relative to the average manufacturing wage: the
lowest-paid manufacturing workers were those in machine operator-, craftsman- and in particular elementary
occupations, who earned wages 27 log points below the manufacturing average in the pooled sample. Only
in low income countries, machine operators commanded wages that were (insignicantly) above-average, and
clerks were paid below the manufacturing average only in high income countries. The second and third
panel show that also educational attainments of workers in elementary-, machine operator- or craftsman
occupation tended to be below or similar to the manufacturing average.
Hence, premature deindustrialization is largely driven by relatively unskilled jobs in elementary and
operator occupations. Medium-skilled clerks are also aectedbut the bottom panel shows that they represent
a much smaller share of manufacturing employment, in particular in low and middle income countries. It is
worth noting that for most of the sample period, machine operators tended to be even less skilled than their
relative wage in Table 3 suggests: about 80 percent of the underlying surveys with income data in this Table
are from the year 2000 or later, so that the numbers are more representative for the later part of the sample
period. Appendix Figure C.2, taken from Kunst (2019), shows that in the 1950s, manufacturing operators
earned wages that were on average 18 log points below those of craftsmen- in contrast to Table 3, which
suggests somewhat higher wages for machine operators than for craftsmen.12
This also highlights a potential caveat of inferring changes in the demand for unskilled labor from changes
10The corresponding p-values of tests for the equality of means are 0.00 for the pooled sample and high income countries,
0.10 for middle income countries, and 0.09 for low income countries. Since I am interested in comparisons between various
pairs of workers, Table 3 omits tests for the signicance of dierences between means for the sake of readability. However, all
dierences discussed in the text are signicant at p-values below 0.10, unless indicated otherwise.
11As we argue in Freeman et al. (2019), taking into account skills obtained through informal training is particularly important
in developing countriesin which formal educational attainments are often low, and where large wage premia among workers
with identical formal educational attainments are common.
12However, the dierence between average machine operator and craftsman wages in Table 3 is signicant only for low income
countries (pval=0.07). In Kunst (2019), I document a pervasive decline in the relative wage of initially skilled craftsmen in
manufacturing, and show that this convergence of manufacturing wages in the `blue collar'/ production occupations in countries
of all income levels has been associated with increasing capital intensities of production.
12
in occupational employment: if machine operator jobs have become not only scarcer, but the remaining
operator jobs also require higher skills, occupational employment trends understate the extent to which the
demand for unskilled workers by manufacturing has decreased. One way of addressing this is to analyze the
evolution of the wage premium that workers with a low educational attainment have been able to command
in manufacturing, relative to other industries (irrespective of their occupation).
Figure 4 plots the evolution of this `manufacturing wage premium' among all workers with less than
completed primary schooling for the rst and the last available year for the 12 countries with income data
in IPUMS: a rst observation is that in all surveys, unskilled workers earned substantially higher wages in
manufacturing than in other industries. In the rst year, they commanded 29 log points higher wages on
average when working in manufacturing. However, the manufacturing wage premium decreased in 10 of
the 12 countries, and the point estimate from a regression on country xed eects and a trend suggests an
average decrease by 3.7 log points per decade.
Appendix Table C.2 shows that also in a sample of 88 countrieswhich includes all IPUMS and I2D2
surveys from countries with wage and educational attainment data for at least two years, the point estimate
implies a similar decrease in the manufacturing wage premium among workers with less than completed
primary schooling of 3.3 log points per decade. By contrast, there is no signicant trend in the relative wage
of workers with a higher education (which on average also did not earn higher wages in manufacturing as
compared to other industries).
These ndings are consistent with the results by Rodrik (2016): he shows that in a sample of 40 mostly
high income countries in the `World Input Output Data Base', it is the share of low-skilled workers who
are employed in manufacturing that has declined after 1995, whereas the shares of medium and high skilled
workers have remained relatively constant.13 In summary, both occupational employment trends and the
reduction of the `manufacturing wage premium' among workers with little formal education suggest that
premature deindustrialization reects a reduction in manufacturing's ability to employ unskilled workers
more productively than other industries.
13In the World Input Output Data Base, `low-skilled' is dened as possessing at most lower secondary education. I choose a
lower educational attainment-cut o to characterize workers with little formal education since my sample includes earlier years
and more developing countries, so that educational attainments tend to be generally lower: among the samples with wage and
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Figure 4: `Manufacturing premium' among workers with less than completed primary schooling (in log
points)
The Figure plots the rst and the last year with income data in IPUMS. The manufacturing premium is calculated as
100*the log ratio of income of those with at most incomplete primary schooling who are employed in manufacturing
relative to those who work in a dierent industry. A regression on country xed eects and a trend suggests an average
decline of the the manufacturing premium by 3.7 log points by decade, with a p-value of 0.075 when clustering standard
errors at the country level. For samples with missing wage income, I use earned income as a proxy if available, and
total income otherwise. For IPUMS surveys which include both wage and earned or total income, correlations
between the manufacturing premia calculated using wage income with those based on earned or total income exceed
0.9, suggesting that these are reasonable proxies.
Stylized Fact II: It's about Formal Jobs
The benets of increasing manufacturing employment are particularly large for formal manufacturing: Ro-
drik (2013) shows that labor productivity in formal manufacturing exhibits `unconditional convergence',
closing the gap to the technology frontier at a rate of 2-3 percent per year. By contrast, La Porta and
Shleifer (2008) paint a bleak picture of informal rms in developing countries: they are sharply less produc-
tive than formal ones, pay lower wages and usually stay informal, consistent with a `dual economy' view of
15
development.14 Finally, Rodrik (2016) highlights the historical role of organized laborassociated with large,
formal manufacturing establishmentsin improving wages and employment conditions.
Table 4 summarizes various indicators of formality included in the surveysagain comparing total man-
ufacturing with other industries, and distinguishing between the dierent manufacturing occupations. The
most widely available formality indicator is the share of wage employment, presented in the rst panel:15
Columns (2) and (3) show that in all income groups, manufacturing workers were more likely to be in wage
employment than those in other industries. The bottom panel shows that manufacturing workers score
higher also in terms of other measures of formality such as having an employment contract, and they tended
to work in larger establishments that were more often located in urban areas.16
However, columns (4)-(8) show that there are large dierences between manufacturing occupations: in
particular workers in elementary-, machine operator- and clerical occupations were more likely to be wage-
employed (84-93 percent on average in the pooled sample, versus only 57 percent for workers outside of
manufacturing), whereas the `formality gap' between manufacturing craftsmen and other industries is smaller
and insignicant. Dierences across manufacturing occupations are particularly striking for low and middle
income countries: even compared to the manufacturing average, workers in elementary-, machine operator-
and clerical occupations in these countries were between 13-42 percentage points more likely to be wage
employed. Also the other formality indicators point in the same direction as craftsmen consistently score
the lowest, pulling down the manufacturing average.
Appendix Table C.4 presents the results of regressions of the share of wage employment on country
xed eects and a trend: it suggests that the share of wage employment increased slightly over time for
machine operators and professionals (by 1.6 and 1.0 percentage points per decade, respectively), but did not
change signicantly for the other occupations. Hence, the cross-sectional ranking of occupations in terms of
formality is likely to be representative for the sample period.
In summary, this suggests that premature deindustrialization is slowing down the formalization of labor
markets: industrialization has traditionally created formal employment opportunities already at intermedi-
ate income levels mostly by creating elementary-, machine operator- and (to a lesser extent) clerical jobs.
However, these are precisely the occupations accounting for the `premature' employment losses.
14From this perspective, economic development comes from creating and growing formal manufacturing rms which displace
informal manufacturing, rather than from a gradual process of business formalization. Also La Porta and Shleifer (2014)
highlight this duality of manufacturing in developing countries, suggesting that some of the advantages of formal manufacturing
may not carry over to informal manufacturing: `although quality is dicult to measure, our visits to furniture and metal-working
factories in Kenya and Madagascar revealed extreme crudeness of the products being made, usually with fairly basic tools, even
when the raw material (as in the case of furniture) was hardwood. Informal factories appear to sell extremely low-quality goods
for low prices to low-income customers.' (p. 113).
15Conversely, La Porta and Shleifer (2008) use the share of self-employment as a proxy for informality, and nd a strong
negative correlation with GDP per capita across countries.
16Dierences between manufacturing and non-manufacturing averages are signicant for the share of wage employment
(pval=0.00, also for all income groups individually), as well as for `contract', the rm size variables and `urban' at p-values





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Stylized Fact III: It's about Jobs that are Vulnerable to Digitization
Manufacturing occupations dier not only in their skill-, but also in their task requirements. Hence, an-
alyzing employment trends through the lens of occupations is informative about the origins of premature
deindustrialization: to the extent that it is driven by technological change, one would expect an asymmetric
reduction of employment in occupations that are intensive in tasks which have only recently become au-
tomatable also in developing countries. Has that been the case for machine operators, clerks and elementary
occupations, but not for craftsmen and professionals?
The task descriptions in the denition of the ISCO major groups by the ILO, presented in Appendix B,
give a rst indication of task dierences between occupations. A second widely used measure is the Routine
Task Intensity (RTI) index introduced by Autor and Dorn (2013): it summarizes the relative importance
of routine- to non-routine tasks in an occupation, and has been used as a proxy for its vulnerability to
substitution by ICT.17
Figure 5 presents average RTI scores by occupation, standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard
deviation of one for the overall labor market. All manufacturing occupations except for professionals score
higher than zero, indicating an above-average vulnerability to automation by ICT. Clerks score particularly
highwhich is consistent with the ILO's assessment that their `main tasks require the knowledge and experi-
ence necessary to organise, store, compute and retrieve information' (quoted from the description of major
groups in Appendix B), and the notion that ICT has sharply reduced the need for workers to engage in such
tasks.
Quantitatively more important are machine operators: their main tasks consist of `operating and mon-
itoring (...) production machinery and equipment '. While factory production with mechanically operated
machines requires a large number of operators, it appears plausible that a move to more autonomous, dig-
itally controlled machines reduces the need for unskilled human machine operators.18 Finally, elementary
occupations require `mostly simple and routine tasks'- and while the relation to ICT is somewhat less clear
than for clerks and machine operators, it is well established that a move to more advanced continuous-process
methods reduces the demand for unskilled laborers.19
At the other end of the routine task intensity spectrum, professionals engage in `planning, directing
and coordinating ' and `applying scientic and artistic concepts and theories to the solution of problems',
which are tasks that are arguably more complementary to than substitutable for ICT. Next to professionals,
also craftsmen have been spared from premature deindustrialization, although they score high on routine
17The task measures underlying the RTI index come from Autor et al. (2003), and are based on the 1977 edition of the US
`Dictionary of Occupational Titles'. I use the translation of these task scores into sub-major groups of ISCO by Goos et al.
(2014). See Appendix Figure C.3 for the individual task scores by occupation, and an explanation for how they are aggregated
into the RTI index.
18Appendix Figure shows that machine operators have the second highest score on `set limits, tolerances and standards'.
Autor et al. (2003) use this task score as a measure for an occupation's demand for routine cognitive tasks, which appear
particularly suitable to being taken over by digitally controlled machines.
19Continuous process methods take in raw matrials and produce nished goods, with few hands intervening in production.
Goldin and Katz (1998) argue that the adoption of such methods reduces the need for elementary occupations by automating
hauling and conveying operations.
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task intensity. One explanation is that manufacturing craftsmen have been vulnerable to automation even
before the advent of ICTas argued already by Jerome (1934) for the US, and documented for a wide
range of countries since the 1950s by Kunst (2019).20Hence, while craftsmen jobs continue to disappear with
increasing automation already at low levels of income (as is apparent in Figure 3), there has not been a
sharp reduction in the demand for craftsmen, conditional on income, after 1990.21
In summary, the evidence suggests that premature industrialization is characterized by job losses in
occupations that appear particularly vulnerable to ICT. This is consistent with evidence of increasing tech-
nology adoption in developing countries in recent decades: capital intensities in manufacturing have increased
signicantly in countries of all income levels (Kunst, 2019), and Jaumotte et al. (2013) show that also in
developing countries, the share of ICT capital in the capital stock has increased rapidly after 1990. Also the
World Bank's 2008 report on technology diusion in developing countries concludes that the speed at which
developing countries adopt new technologies has increased since 1990.22
20According to ISCO, craftsmen are `occupations whose tasks require the knowledge and experience of skilled trades or
handicrafts'. For the US, Jerome (1934) predicts that `the principal eect of further mechanization of the processing operations
will be to decrease the demand for semiskilled workers. (...) On the whole, the shift will continue to be from the emphasis
on the trade skill typical of the handicraftsman to, on the one hand, the alertness and intelligence required in handling fast
and intricate machinery and, on the other, to the more formal training required in the engineering and production planning
departments' (pp. 402-403).
21Because craftsmen score higher in terms of the RTI index than machine operators and elementary occupations, the as-
sociation between the RTI index of an occupation group and its propensity to experience premature deindustrialization after
1990 is imperfect. Appendix Table C.5 tests whether it is still true that on average, occupation groups with a higher RTI
score experienced signicantly stronger premature deindustrialization: the sample corresponds to the one from Table 2, with
the dierence that it stacks the employment shares in the dierent occupations. To exploit the full available variation in RTI
scores, it distinguishes between major groups 1-3 (`managers', `professionals' and `associate professionals'), which all have RTI
scores below 0 and are subsumed into the `professional' category in the rest of this paper. The specication includes country-
occupation xed eecs, in analogy to the country xed eects of the specications in Table 2. The signicant `triple interactions'
between the ln GDP per capita terms, the RTI index and the post-1990 dummy show that occupations with a high RTI index
did on average experience stronger premature deindustrialization. Therefore, the argument that premature deindustrialization
after 1990 has been driven in particular by occupations that are vulnerable to digitization is also robust to considering the RTI
index as a perfect proxy for this vulnerability.
22The report concludes that `since the early 1990s, technological progress in both low- and middle-income countries has
increased more rapidly than in high-income countries' (p. xi), with the eect that `the technology gap between middle-income
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Figure 5: Routine task intensity scores by occupation
The routine task intensity (RTI) scores are calculated as in Autor and Dorn (2013), based on the translation of task
scores from the 1977 US `Dictionary of Occupational Titles' into sub-major groups of ISCO-88 by Goos et al. (2014). It
is normalized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one across these sub-major groups. The gure shows
occupation group averages constructed from 11 sub-major groups that are relevant to manufacturing, as indicated
by representation among the manufacturing occupations in the extended `Occupational Wages Around the World'
data base (and hence, in the underlying ILO `October Inquiry'- see Freeman et al. (2011) for more details). This
excludes major groups 5 (`Service and sales workers') and 6 (`Skilled agricultural, forestry and shery workers'), as
well as some sub-major groups that do not play a role in manufacturing (for instance, sub-major group 23: `Teaching
Professionals').
Stylized Fact IV: Some Manufacturing Jobs also Appear at lower Levels of In-
come
The simulations summarized in Figure 3 suggest that while manufacturing employment overall peaked at
lower income and employment levels after 1990, low income countries actually saw more rather than less
manufacturing employment.23 One concern is that this nding may be driven by the implicitly assumed
23The curves intersect around $7,000 for total manufacturing and machine operators, $6,700 for clerks, and $10,200 for
elementary occupations- suggesting higher manufacturing employment below that income level after 1990. In 2014 (the last
year in the sample), about 41 percent of the world population lived in countries with a GDP per capita below $7,000 in 2011
20
symmetry when using a quadratic functional form. However, Figure 6 shows that at least for the joint
employment share in machine operator and elementary occupations, also locally weighted regressions on the
raw data suggest that low income countries have been spared from premature job losses, and possibly even
had higher manufacturing employment after 1990 (conditional on income).24
The Goldin and Katz (1998) framework on the eects of technological change in manufacturing on labor
demand oers an explanation: in their model, the `rst transition' from production in artisanal shops to
factories increases the demand for unskilled workers in machine operator and elementary occupations, before
further advances of the production technology reduce it.
While the original framework has been used to explain the US experience, it also appears relevant to
recent labor demand trends in developing countries: Section 2 shows that manufacturing in low income
countries still used to be dominated by craftsmen and hence relatively small-scale and artisanal. This is
consistent with the characterization of manufacturing in developing countries in the literature review by
Tybout (2000). Moroever, the evidence suggests that there has been an acceleration of technology adoption
(as argued in the previous Section), which would be expected to change the composition of occupational
labor demand towards occupations associated with larger-scale factory production.25
international dollars- with China above, yet India below this income threshold. When translating the nominal World Bank
income group-thresholds in 1990 to 2011 international dollars using the average Penn World Table price level estimates from
the respective income group, the `low income' country-threshold stood at about $2,100, and the `lower middle' income country
threshold stood at about $9,900. Hence, the simulations suggest that countries classied as low income countries in 1990, as
well as some lower middle income countries, have been spared from premature deindustrialization.
24For total manufacturing employment and clerical occupations, the nding of `early industrialization' in low income countries
depends on the quadratic functional form and country xed eects. However, the evidence robustly suggests that low income
countries have been spared from premature deindustrialization also for total manufacturing. See Appendix Figure C.4 for
plots of the raw data separately for total manufacturing and each occupation, which also include the tted lines from a locally
weighted regression for both periods.
25The World Bank report on technology adoption (World Bank, 2008) highlights that technological change in developing
countries has mostly taken the form of adopting technologies that had already been well established in high income countries,
as opposed to innvations from developing countries themselves: `while a strong correlation exists between scientic innovation
and invention and income in high-income countries, almost none of this kind of activity is being performed in developing
countries. As a result, virtually all technological progress in developing countries comes from the adoption and adaptation of
preexisting technologies' (p. 52). Often, these are the same machines that had previously been used in high income countries,
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Figure 6: Manufacturing employment in joint machine operator and elementary occupations
Every dot represents the joint manufacturing employment share in machine operator or elementary occupations from
a country-year up to or after 1990. Moreover, the Figures include non-parametric estimates of the employment shares
by GDP per capita in both periods, produced using the `lowess' command in Stata, using the default bandwidth.
For concrete examples of changes in the employment share of machine operators and elementary occupa-
tions after 1990, Figure 7 plots the employment share from the rst and the last year for the 121 countries
with at least two surveys from that period. The Figure connects and labels observations from the 10 coun-
tries which experienced the largest decrease in machine operators and elementary employment, and the 10
countries experiencing the largest increase. 6 of the 10 countries with the largest decreases were classied as
middle income countries in 1990 (such as South Africa/ZAF, Costa Rica/CRI and Jamaica/JAM), whereas
7 of the 10 countries with the largest increases were classied as low income countries (such as China/CHN,
Cambodia-/KHM and Ethiopia/ETH).26
Diao et al. (2017b) argue that in Ethiopia, employment gains in light manufacturing since the early 1990s
26Moroever, the data for Bangladesh (`BGD'), a low income country for which the Figure suggests strongly decreasing
manufacturing employment in elementary or operator occupations, appears dubious: the surveys suggest increasing total man-
ufacturing employment between both years (2000 and 2013), driven by strongly increasing craftsman employment. However,
there is no evidence of such a shift from elementary or operator to craftsman occupations in the previous available survey from
2010.
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have been based on the processing of agricultural products, and are the result of successful eorts of the
Ethiopian government to attract foreign investors. McMillan et al. (2014) and Diao et al. (2017a) point to
recent manufacturing employment gains in several additional African low-income countries, also suggesting
that such gains have not been limited to Asia.27 Finally, Appendix Table C.3 shows that also the decrease
of the manufacturing wage premium among unskilled workers has been driven by middle income countries,
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Figure 7: Employment changes after 1990 in joint machine operator and elementary employment
For 121 countries with at least two surveys after 1990, the Figure plots the joint manufacturing employment share
in machine operator or elementary occupations for both the rst and the last year in the sample (on average, these
years are 1998 and 2010). For the 10 countries with the largest employment gains or losses in these occupations, I
connect both observations and assign a country label. The employment share in the bottom 10 countries on average
decreased by 5.1 percentage points, and 6 of them were classied as middle income countries in 1990. The top 10
countries on average increased their employment share by 4.7 percentage points between both years, and 7 of them
were classied as low income countries in 1990.
In summary, the evidence suggests that premature deindustrialization has to date spared low income
27Diao et al. (2017a) conclude that `although the employment share in manufacturing is not expanding rapidly, in most of
the low-income African countries the employment share in manufacturing has not peaked and is still expanding, albeit from
very low levels' (p. 28).
23
countries. There are even some signs of increasing manufacturing employment conditional on income for
poorer developing countries, most clearly in elementary and machine operator occupations. This is consistent
with the view that the move from artisanal to more modern, larger-scale production creates opportunities for
employment industrialization in low income countriesin particular if they follow the example of countries like
Cambodia or China by tapping into foreign demand for consumer goods in relatively low-tech manufacturing
industries such as garments, footwear or electronics assembly.
4 Concluding Remarks
Occupational employment trends paint a nuanced picture of the future prospects for manufacturing-led
growth in developing countries: on the one hand, the trend towards more open goods and capital markets
appears to facilitate some employment industrialization in low income countries by increasing technology
transfer and export opportunities.28 At the same time, this technology transfer appears to have markedly
reduced employment opportunities in unskilled, yet formal, machine operator and elementary occupations in
middle income countries in recent decades, resulting in much lower peak manufacturing employment shares.
It is useful to compare this account with Akamatsu's (1962) `ying geese paradigm' of development: in
his tale, the technologically most advanced countries are `chased' by exporters of consumer goods, which are
in turn chased by exporters of raw materials, the least advanced countries. The occupational employment
pattern can then be understood as resulting from a reduction in the technological distance between countries
(or as `geese ying closer together'): low income countries move towards the export of consumer goods such
as garments, creating employment in the more formal manufacturing occupations, whereas middle income
countries adopt the capital- and skill-intensive production technologies of the most advanced countries,
resulting in employment losses in the occupations that are most vulnerable to digitization.29
The notion of a convergence of manufacturing production technologies is consistent with China, a middle
income country, being the largest buyer of high-tech industrial robots in 2017, accounting for more than
a third of global robot sales (International Federation of Robotics, 2018). It is also consistent with the
ndings of a companion paper (Kunst, 2019), which documents that capital intensities in manufacturing
have increased substantially over recent decades also in developing countrieswith profound impacts on the
structure of occupational employment and wages within manufacturing. Finally, it is in line with both
stylized facts emerging from the historical account of technology adoption by Comin and Hobijn (2010):
while there are large cross-country dierences in the extent to which new technologies are adopted, the
28See Jaumotte et al. (2013) for an illustration of the increases in various measures of trade and nancial openness by income
group since 1980.
29In the notation of Akamatsu (1962), low income countries are moving from stages one and two (import of consumer goods
and production for the domestic market) to stage three (export of consumer goods), whereas middle income countries join high
income countries by moving from stage three to stage four (product dierentiation and export of capital goods). Akamatsu also
acknowledges that the distance between the `ying geese' of histale can vary over time: `however, these countries, advanced
and less advanced, do not necessarily go forward at the same speed in their development of a wild-geese-ying pattern, nor do
they always make gradual progress, but they are at times dormant and at other times make leaping advances' (p. 18).
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adoption lag length has decreased over time.
From this perspective, premature deindustrialization is the result of a global shift of the frontier separat-
ing manufacturing tasks that are automated from those that are still performed by human labor. Therefore,
it appears unlikely that China further moving up the development ladder will bring back unskilled manufac-
turing employment on a large scale to other developing countries, as suggested by Haraguchi et al. (2017).
Rather, the question is whether further shifts of the `automation frontier' will reduce the scope for even the
moderate increases in unskilled manufacturing employment that still prevails today in low income countries.
Note that this account does not negate the role of globalization in creating premature deindustrialization:
increasing openness has facilitated technology transferand also increased the pressure to adopt more ad-
vanced production technologies via stronger import competition, as well as increased the benets of doing so
by facilitating the access to the markets of high income countries (featuring higher quality standards). More-
over, Rodrik (2018) argues that the emergence of global value chains with consecutive and interdependent
production steps has reduced the scope of manufacturing rms in developing countries to substitute capi-
tal with unskilled labor, which is consistent with the decrease in the `manufacturing premium' of unskilled
workers documented in this paper.
250 years after the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, it appears that manufacturing is losing its
ability to employ unskilled workers more productively than other industries. As Rodrik (2018) points out,
this implies that developing countries, abundant in unskilled labor, lose their comparative advantage in
producing an increasing range of manufactured goods.30 Hence, future growth in developing countries may
have to rely more on improvements in `fundamentals' such as education and governance, and policy makers
need to focus on a broader range of sectoral policies than in the past (Stiglitz, 2018). Absent a reduction in
the `formality gap' between manufacturing and other industries, it will also create employment that is less
formal.
30This is also evidenced by the increasing instances of `reshoring' of production to high income countries (Gray et al., 2013).
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A Sample Construction and Coverage
The rst data source is the `International Income Distribution data set' (I2D2), which is a harmonized
collection of nationally representative and harmonized household surveys maintained by the World Bank. It
is rst described in Montenegro and Hirn (2009), but has been extended signicantly since then. The data
in this paper are based on the full I2D2 data base as of March 2019. I2D2 draws on a variety of surveys
such as labor force surveys, budget surveys, and the World Bank's Living Standards Measurement Surveys.
Industry and occupation codes are harmonized to the 1-digit level of ISIC and ISCO, respectively. I calculate
employment shares for all men and women aged 15-64 in civilian employment, using the survey weights. If
several surveys are available for a country-year, I take the average values across surveys, using the square
root of the number of manufacturing observations as weight. I2D2 includes surveys from 139 countries, but
has very limited coverage for years before 1990.
I hence complement I2D2 with the surveys of the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS),
provided by the Minnesota Population Center (2018). IPUMS contains data with 1-digit level of ISIC and
ISCO codes from 76 countries, the large majority of which are census extracts. I again calculate employment
shares for all men and women aged 15-64 in civilian employment, using the person weights. Finally, I combine
the I2D2 and IPUMS surveys. If a country-year observation is available from both sources, I give preference
to the IPUMS data, as IPUMS census extracts tend to contain a larger number of observations and the
sampling is likely to be more harmonized.31 I did not engage in any further `cleaning' of the resulting data
set.
The combined sample includes manufacturing employment shares from 148 countries and 980 country-
years between 1960 and 2016. The main sample used in the regression analyses excludes countries for which
the Penn World Table 9.0 (Feenstra et al., 2015) does not include data on real GDP per capita, or for which
31For 47 country-years from 30 countries, I have estimates from both I2D2 and IPUMS. The correlation between the estimated
employment shares for total manufacturing from both sources is 0.88.
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data are available for only a single year. This sample includes data for 925 country-years between 1960 and
2014. 112 of the country-years are from the period up to 1990. For 43 countries, at least one survey from
both up to and after 1990 is available. The Tables below summarize the data availability by country in the
main sample.
The additional 23 countries, which enter into the calculations in Table 3, are: Afghanistan, Bahamas,
Barbados, Belarus, Burundi, Chad, Croatia, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Guyana, Kiribati, Kosovo, Marshall
Islands, Micronesia, Papua New Guinea, Puerto Rico, Solomon Islands, South Sudan, Sudan, St. Lucia,
Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga.
Table A.1: 43 countries with samples in both periods (up to and post-1990)
First year Last year Total surveys -to 1990 -post 1990
ARG - Argentina 1970 2014 12 2 10
AUT - Austria 1971 2008 9 2 7
BEN - Benin 1979 2013 4 1 3
BOL - Bolivia 1976 2014 16 1 15
BRA - Brazil 1960 2014 27 13 14
CAN - Canada 1971 2011 5 2 3
CHE - Switzerland 1970 2000 4 3 1
CHL - Chile 1960 2013 16 5 11
CRI - Costa Rica 1973 2012 15 2 13
DEU - Germany 1970 2008 6 2 4
DOM - Dominican Republic 1960 2013 10 3 7
ECU - Ecuador 1962 2014 12 3 9
EGY - Egypt, Arab Rep. 1986 2006 7 2 5
ESP - Spain 1981 2011 11 1 10
FJI - Fiji 1976 2008 4 1 3
FRA - France 1962 2011 12 5 7
GHA - Ghana 1984 2012 7 1 6
GIN - Guinea 1983 1994 2 1 1
GRC - Greece 1971 2011 10 2 8
HND - Honduras 1961 2014 22 2 20
HTI - Haiti 1982 2007 3 1 2
IDN - Indonesia 1971 2009 19 5 14
IND - India 1983 2011 8 2 6
IRL - Ireland 1971 2011 13 3 10
JAM - Jamaica 1982 2002 7 2 5
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MAR - Morocco 1982 2004 5 1 4
MEX - Mexico 1970 2010 15 3 12
MLI - Mali 1987 2009 4 1 3
MWI - Malawi 1987 2013 5 1 4
MYS - Malaysia 1970 2000 4 2 2
NIC - Nicaragua 1971 2009 7 1 6
PAK - Pakistan 1973 2014 15 1 14
PAN - Panama 1960 2012 22 5 17
PRT - Portugal 1981 2011 9 1 8
PRY - Paraguay 1962 2012 9 3 6
SEN - Senegal 1988 2001 3 1 2
THA - Thailand 1981 2011 18 9 9
TTO - Trinidad and Tobago 1980 2000 3 2 1
TUR - Turkey 1985 2010 13 2 11
URY - Uruguay 1963 2014 21 2 19
USA - United States 1960 2010 7 4 3
VEN - Venezuela, RB 1981 2006 9 3 6
ZMB - Zambia 1990 2014 9 1 8
TOTAL 1960 2014 439 110 329
Table A.2: 82 countries with samples in one period (up to or post-1990)
First year Last year Total surveys -to 1990 -post 1990
AGO - Angola 2000 2014 3 0 3
ALB - Albania 2002 2008 3 0 3
ARM - Armenia 2011 2013 2 0 2
AUS - Australia 2001 2010 10 0 10
BEL - Belgium 2004 2011 8 0 8
BFA - Burkina Faso 1996 2014 4 0 4
BGD - Bangladesh 2000 2013 5 0 5
BGR - Bulgaria 2003 2010 5 0 5
BIH - Bosnia and Herzegovina 2001 2007 2 0 2
BLZ - Belize 1993 1999 6 0 6
BTN - Bhutan 2003 2012 3 0 3
BWA - Botswana 1991 2011 5 0 5
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CHN - China 2002 2013 4 0 4
CMR - Cameroon 2001 2014 5 0 5
COL - Colombia 1964 1973 2 2 0
COM - Comoros 2004 2013 2 0 2
CPV - Cabo Verde 2000 2007 2 0 2
CYP - Cyprus 2005 2008 4 0 4
CZE - Czech Republic 2005 2008 4 0 4
DNK - Denmark 2004 2008 5 0 5
EST - Estonia 2000 2008 9 0 9
ETH - Ethiopia 1995 2014 12 0 12
FIN - Finland 2004 2008 5 0 5
GBR - United Kingdom 1991 2008 6 0 6
GEO - Georgia 2008 2013 6 0 6
GMB - Gambia, The 1998 2010 3 0 3
GTM - Guatemala 2000 2006 5 0 5
HUN - Hungary 2001 2011 7 0 7
IRN - Iran, Islamic Rep. 2006 2011 2 0 2
IRQ - Iraq 1997 2012 3 0 3
ISL - Iceland 2004 2008 5 0 5
ITA - Italy 2001 2011 7 0 7
JOR - Jordan 2000 2014 14 0 14
KEN - Kenya 1999 2005 2 0 2
KGZ - Kyrgyz Republic 1999 2011 2 0 2
KHM - Cambodia 1997 2012 8 0 8
LBN - Lebanon 2004 2011 2 0 2
LBR - Liberia 2008 2014 3 0 3
LKA - Sri Lanka 1992 2014 20 0 20
LSO - Lesotho 2002 2010 3 0 3
LTU - Lithuania 2003 2008 6 0 6
LUX - Luxembourg 2004 2011 8 0 8
LVA - Latvia 2005 2008 4 0 4
MDA - Moldova 1998 2014 16 0 16
MDG - Madagascar 2001 2012 3 0 3
MDV - Maldives 1998 2009 4 0 4
MMR - Myanmar 2005 2010 2 0 2
MNE - Montenegro 2006 2010 2 0 2
MNG - Mongolia 2000 2011 7 0 7
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MOZ - Mozambique 1996 2014 4 0 4
MRT - Mauritania 2004 2014 3 0 3
MUS - Mauritius 1999 2012 13 0 13
NAM - Namibia 1993 2014 6 0 6
NER - Niger 2007 2014 3 0 3
NGA - Nigeria 1993 2012 6 0 6
NLD - Netherlands 2001 2011 7 0 7
NOR - Norway 2004 2008 5 0 5
NPL - Nepal 1995 2010 5 0 5
PER - Peru 1993 2014 19 0 19
PHL - Philippines 1997 2014 15 0 15
POL - Poland 1997 2011 14 0 14
PSE - West Bank and Gaza 1997 2008 12 0 12
ROU - Romania 1992 2013 12 0 12
RUS - Russian Federation 2004 2009 5 0 5
RWA - Rwanda 2002 2013 3 0 3
SLE - Sierra Leone 2003 2014 2 0 2
SLV - El Salvador 1991 2014 16 0 16
SVK - Slovak Republic 2005 2008 4 0 4
SVN - Slovenia 2002 2011 10 0 10
SWE - Sweden 2004 2011 8 0 8
SWZ - Swaziland 1995 2000 2 0 2
SYC - Seychelles 2006 2013 2 0 2
SYR - Syrian Arab Republic 1997 2003 2 0 2
TJK - Tajikistan 1999 2009 3 0 3
TUN - Tunisia 1997 2011 5 0 5
TZA - Tanzania 2000 2014 7 0 7
UGA - Uganda 1999 2012 5 0 5
UZB - Uzbekistan 2000 2003 3 0 3
VNM - Vietnam 1997 2010 8 0 8
YEM - Yemen, Rep. 1998 2005 2 0 2
ZAF - South Africa 1995 2014 12 0 12
ZWE - Zimbabwe 2001 2011 3 0 3
TOTAL 1964 2014 486 2 484
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B Description of ISCO major groups
1. Legislators, senior ocials and managers: This major group includes occupations whose main
tasks consist of determining and formulating government policies, as well as laws and public regulations,
overseeing their implementation, representing governments and acting on their behalf, or planning,
directing and coordinating the policies and activities of enterprises and organisations, or departments.
Reference to skill level has not been made in dening the scope of this major group, which has been
divided into three sub-major groups, eight minor groups and 33 unit groups, reecting dierences in
tasks associated with dierent areas of authority and dierent types of enterprises and organisations.
2. Professionals: This major group includes occupations whose main tasks require a high level of pro-
fessional knowledge and experience in the elds of physical and life sciences, or social sciences and
humanities. The main tasks consist of increasing the existing stock of knowledge, applying scientic
and artistic concepts and theories to the solution of problems, and teaching about the foregoing in a
systematic manner. Most occupations in this major group require skills at the fourth ISCO skill level.
This major group has been divided into four sub-major groups, 18 minor groups and 55 unit groups,
reecting dierences in tasks associated with dierent elds of knowledge and specialisation.
3. Technicians and associate professionals: This major group includes occupations whose main
tasks require technical knowledge and experience in one or more elds of physical and life sciences, or
social sciences and humanities. The main tasks consist of carrying out technical work connected with
the application of concepts and operational methods in the above-mentioned elds, and in teaching at
certain educational levels. Most occupations in this major group require skills at the third ISCO skill
level. This major group has been divided into four sub-major groups, 21 minor groups and 73 unit
groups, reecting dierences in tasks associated with dierent elds of knowledge and specialisation.
4. Clerks: This major group includes occupations whose main tasks require the knowledge and experience
necessary to organise, store, compute and retrieve information. The main tasks consist of performing
secretarial duties, operating word processors and other oce machines, recording and computing nu-
merical data, and performing a number of customer-oriented clerical duties, mostly in connection with
mail services, money-handling operations and appointments. Most occupations in this major group
require skills at the second ISCO skill level. This major group has been divided into two sub-major
groups, seven minor groups and 23 unit groups, reecting dierences in tasks associated with dierent
areas of specialisation.
5. Service workers and shop and market sales workers: (omitted)
6. Skilled agricultural and shery workers: (omitted)
7. Craft and related trades workers: This major group includes occupations whose tasks require
the knowledge and experience of skilled trades or handicrafts which, among other things, involves an
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understanding of materials and tools to be used, as well as of all stages of the production process,
including the characteristics and the intended use of the nal product. The main tasks consist of
extracting raw materials, constructing buildings and other structures and making various products as
well as handicraft goods. Most occupations in this major group require skills at the second ISCO skill
level. This major group has been divided into four sub-major groups, 16 minor groups and 70 unit
groups, reecting dierences in tasks associated with dierent areas of specialisation.
8. Plant and machine operators and assemblers: This major group includes occupations whose
main tasks require the knowledge and experience necessary to operate and monitor large scale, and
often highly automated, industrial machinery and equipment. The main tasks consist of operating and
monitoring mining, processing and production machinery and equipment, as well as driving vehicles and
driving and operating mobile plant, or assembling products from component parts. Most occupations in
this major group require skills at the second ISCO skill level. This major group has been divided into
three sub-major groups, 20 minor groups and 70 unit groups, reecting dierences in tasks associated
with dierent areas of specialisation.
9. Elementary occupations: This major group covers occupations which require the knowledge and
experience necessary to perform mostly simple and routine tasks, involving the use of hand-held tools
and in some cases considerable physical eort, and, with few exceptions, only limited personal initiative
or judgement. The main tasks consist of selling goods in streets, doorkeeping and property watching,
as well as cleaning, washing, pressing, and working as labourers in the elds of mining, agriculture
and shing, construction and manufacturing. Most occupations in this major group require skills at
the rst ISCO skill level. This major group has been divided into three sub-major groups, ten minor
groups and 25 unit groups, reecting dierences in tasks associated with dierent areas of work.
Source: ILO
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Figure C.1: Simulated employment within manufacturing, by occupation (percentage points)
The Figure corresponds to Figure 2 in the main text- with the dierence that the dependent variable in the regression




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































109 countries, 1953−1960 period
Figure C.2: Occupational wage premia in manufacturing in the 1950s (in log points)
Source: the extended `Occupational Wages Around the World' (OWW) data base as described by Freeman et al.
(2011). The Figure plots the average deviations of manufacturing wages in the respective major group from craftsman
wages, in a sample of 109 countries between 1953-1960, along with the 95 percent condence intervals. Coecients are
obtained from a regression of 8,258 average annual log wages from 24 manufacturing occupations that belonging to one
of the 4 occupation groups on country-year dummies and major group dummies. The sample does not include wages
from clerical occupations. See Kunst (2019) for an analyses of trends in occupational wage premia in manufacturing
over time.
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Table C.2: Trends in the manufacturing wage premium
Dependent variable: Manufacturing premium in log points
(1) (2)
Less than primary completed At least primary completed
Trend/10 -3.29+ -1.58
(1.90) (1.38)
Country xed eects X X
Mean dep. var. 13.24 -3.05
Countries 88 88
Observations 601 601
The manufacturing premium is calculated as 100*the log ratio of income of those with at most incomplete primary
schooling who are employed in manufacturing relative to those who work in a dierent industry. Wage data are taken
from IPUMS and I2D2. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country level. + p < 0.1,∗ p < 0.05,∗∗ p <
0.01.
Table C.3: Trends in the manufacturing wage premium by income group
Dependent variable: Manufacturing premium in log points
Less than primary completed, by income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pooled Low Middle High
Trend/10 -3.29+ -2.53 -4.37∗ -0.11
(1.90) (5.75) (1.99) (4.38)
Country xed eects X X X X
Mean dep. var. 13.24 15.41 11.14 18.48
Countries 88 27 46 15
Observations 601 143 369 89
The manufacturing premium is calculated as 100*the log ratio of income of those with at most incomplete primary
schooling who are employed in manufacturing relative to those who work in a dierent industry. Wage data are taken
from IPUMS and I2D2. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country level. + p < 0.1,∗ p < 0.05,∗∗ p <
0.01.
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Table C.4: Trends in the share of wage employment in manufacturing
Dependent variable: Wage employment in manufacturing (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Elementary Operators Craftsmen Clerks Professionals
Trend/10 0.47 -0.61 1.57+ -0.48 0.46 0.95+
(0.52) (0.54) (0.83) (0.79) (0.92) (0.52)
Country xed eects X X X X X X
Mean dep. var. 73.17 88.00 87.17 64.98 93.54 77.84
Countries 122 122 122 122 122 122
Observations 921 915 912 912 899 919
Data are taken from IPUMS and I2D2. The number of surveys included dieres slightly across columns because not
all surveys include manufacturing workers in all occupations. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country
level. + p < 0.1,∗ p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Direction, control & planning
GED math
Eye−hand−food coordination
Set limits, tolerances & stand.
Finger dexterity
Professionals Operators Elementary Occ.
Craftsmen Clerks
Figure C.3: Task scores by occupation
Task measures come from the 1977 US `Dictionary of Occupational Titles', and are based on the ranking of occupations
in the 1960 distribution of task input in the USA. Tey range between 0 and 10. See Autor et al. (2003) for a detailed
description. I make use of a translation of these US scores into sub-major groups of ISCO-88 by Goos et al. (2014).
The gure shows occupation group averages constructed from 11 sub-major groups that are relevant to manufacturing,
as indicated by representation among the manufacturing occupations in the extended `Occupational Wages Around
the World' data base (and hence, in the ILO `October Inquiry', which it is based on- see Freeman et al. (2011)
for a description). This excludes major groups 5 (`Service and sales workers') and 6 (`Skilled agricultural, forestry
and shery workers'), as well as some sub-major groups that appear not relevant for manufacturing (for instance,
sub-major group 23: `Teaching Professionals').
The RTI indices of occupations in Figure 5 are calculated from the individual task indices as follows, following Autor
et al. (2003): rst, they are combined to produce three task aggregates: the Manual task measure corresponds to
the DOT variable measuring an occupation's demand for eye-hand-foot coordination; the Routine task measure is
a simple average of two DOT variables, set limits, tolerances and standards measuring an occupation's demand
for routine cognitive tasks, and nger dexterity, measuring an occupation's use of routine motor tasks; and the
Abstract task measure is the average of two DOT variables: direction control and planning, measuring managerial
and interactive tasks, and GED Math, measuring mathematical and formal reasoning requirements. Second, the
RTI index is constructed from these aggregates as the dierence between the log of Routine task score and the sum
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Lowess fit Lowess fit
Figure C.4: Manufacturing employment shares by period: raw data and non-parametric t
Every dot represents a survey from a country-year up to or after 1990. Moreover, the Figures include non-parametric
estimates of the employment shares by GDP per capita in both periods, produced using the `lowess' command in
Stata, using the default bandwidth.
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Table C.5: Manufacturing employment as a function of income: period up to versus post-1990, by RTI
Dependent variable: manufacturing employment by occupation (percentage points)
ln GDP/c 3.32∗∗
(0.92)
ln GDP/c squared -0.17∗∗
(0.05)
ln GDP/c x RTI 2.91∗∗
(0.71)
ln GDP/c squared x RTI -0.17∗∗
(0.04)
ln GDP/c x post-1990 0.31∗∗
(0.09)
ln GDP/c squared x post-1990 -0.04∗∗
(0.01)
ln GDP/c x RTI x post-1990 0.16+
(0.09)
ln GDP/c squared x RTI x post-1990 -0.02+
(0.01)
Country-occupation xed eects X
Population controls X
F-test joint GDP/c x RTI x post-1990 0.10
Mean dependent variable 1.87
Countries 125
Observations 6,475
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country level. + p < 0.1,∗ p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01. The sample
corresponds to the one from Table 2, with the dierence that it stacks the employment shares in seven occupation
groups: `managers', `professionals', `associate professionals', `clerks', `craftsman', `machine operators' and `elementary
occupations'. The number of observations hence results from multiplying the 925 country-years with the 7 occupations.
`RTI' stands for the index of Routine Task Intensity. `Population controls' in the bottom panel stands for ln population
and its square, as well as interactions with the RTI score. The row `F-test joint GDP/c' presents the p-values of an
F-test for joint signicance of ln GDP/c and its square, interacted with the RTI score and a `post-1990' dummy.
42
